Distributor:  Scorpion TV
Length:  57 minutes
Date:  2012
Genre:  Expository
Language:  Dutch; English / English subtitles
Color/BW:  Color
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Panopticon

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With the spread of electronics and computer networks, privacy is disappearing everywhere, even in the most liberal democracies. What are the implications of this new digital panopticon?

Panopticon

Do you have “Nothing to hide?” That makes you one of many. But control on your personal life is increasing, and privacy is under attack. But how does this work exactly, why are once liberal countries especially privacy troubled, and when will you start to feel the consequences? Panopticon is a must see film, especially in the light of the Snowden affair which has revealed just how much data is collected, stored, and acted upon.

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1

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A documentary by Peter Vlemmix.

 

2

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Technology is becoming

better and more interesting everyday.

 

3

00:00:32,662 --> 00:00:34,122

And more important.

 

4

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We are the digital generation.

 

5

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We can have more freedom.

 

6

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We can become smarter.

 

7

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We can be more creative.

 

8

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We are one, with our friends.

 

9

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We are living the techno dream...

 

10

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...right?

 

11

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People don't know it's happening,

why would they become angry?

 

12

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This is me.

 

13

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I also love technology.

 

14

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I have a smartphone, Macbook, Twitter,

Fitness center membership card with RFID-chip,

 

15

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Navigation in my car,

and I'm always online.

 

16

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But I started noticing something.

 

17

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You know, the small signs.

 

18

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City decides to places extra camera's.

 

19

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Facebook argues over privacy.

 

20

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The Netherlands introduce

digital border surveillance.

 

21

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It intrigued me.

 

22

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What is actually known about you and me?

 

23

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"I don't mind the government

knowing what I'm doing."

 

24

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"I don't have much to hide,

I don't really worry about it."

 

25

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On the question whether privacy

is important for us,

 

26

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us Dutch people say 'No' more than

any other European nation.

 

27

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How is that possible?

 

28

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I decided to investigate, what the

 current state of privacy in our nation is.

 

29

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Are we being watched?

 

30

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And how?

 

31

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And do we really

have nothing to hide?

 

32

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This one is nice.

 

33

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Yes, thank you,

 

34

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If you would click on the screen here.

 

35

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For the age check.

 

36

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Then the counter will open,

and I can do the transaction.

 

37

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The age check?

- Yes

 

38

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But I have brought my drivers license.

 

39

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Okay, but we check the age

using this device.

 

40

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So they know that I

am doing a good job.

 

41

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What if I say I don't want to use it?

 

42

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Then the counter won't open

- Then I can't buy this?

 

43

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No, no, then you can't buy it.

Or you could find another store,

 

44

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where that is still possible.

 

45

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Okay, so, how does it work?

 

46

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'Start', and then

the left button.

 

47

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And then he observes you trough here.

 

48

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You see the counter opens,

so it fully agrees with you.

 

49

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Who is watching then?

 

50

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There is a women watching, from Breda.

 

51

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I decided to go and pay

the woman in Breda a visit.

 

52

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What does she know about me?

 

53

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Is she going to keep track of

how many beers I drink?

 

54

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The woman in Breda appeared to

be a big man instead.

 

55

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On the moment I press this button,

 

56

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I not only give the order to the system

to authorize the transaction.

 

here: delete a crap

 

58

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But at the same time, I am telling

the system to delete the recorded images.

 

59

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So it can't be used for

police investigations?

 

60

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No, last year we were approached by the

DOJ.

 

62

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who asked "Can't you help us, if needed

with providing image data?"

 

64

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I was glad to be able to say

"No we can't."

 

65

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Could that be different

in two years time?

 

66

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No, not a chance.

 

67

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Not in the future?

- No.

 

68

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At the moment we were to start

storing personal information,

 

 

71

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That is not allowed.

 

72

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I am not sure if I like having

to be scanned in the liquor store.

 

73

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But no information is being stored,

and it's told.

 

74

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It is like this everywhere?

 

75

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This is a face recognition camera.

 

76

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It scans me right now.

 

77

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Using state of the art face recognition techniques,

it checks a database with unwanted travelers.

 

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To alert people if necessary.

 

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As a passenger, you don't

realize you are being scanned.

 

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There is no label at the door that says

'Facial recognition system in use.'

 

81

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So people are being scanned without

them realizing it happens?

 

82

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Correct, most people don't notice.

Its purely automatic.

 

83

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The scan of my face is stored in the

database of the transportation company.

 

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There it is stored for 7 days.

 

85

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Isn't it a bit weird to sneakily

record every passenger?

 

86

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How else are we supposed

to check them?

 

87

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Well, the old way; "Hi sir, please

show me your ticket."

 

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Recently there was a small

disturbance in a tram in Rotterdam.

 

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A reporter noticed the way the driver

reported to the station operator.

 

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The entire conversation appeared

to be recorded, and stored as evidence.

 

91

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Audio recording and face recognition.

 

92

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Welcome to the Rotterdam trams.

 

93

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But doesn't this cross the border of

invading into my privacy?

 

94

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The 1966 UN law on privacy

says the following;

 

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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or

unlawful interference in his private life.

 

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family, home or correspondence, nor to

unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.

 

9,

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Everyone has the right to the protection

of the law against such interference or attacks.

 

98

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Tell me honestly :

 

99

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do you ever wonder what

6 minutes look like?

 

100

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Every 6 minutes, your ISP records

who you are calling,

 

101

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where you are,

whether you go online.

 

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if you're sending an email,

or receiving one.

 

103

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Every 300 seconds, that

is 225 times per day.

 

104

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This monitoring is called

data retention.

 

105

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Since 2006, the European Union

requires your telecom provider

 

106

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to store all this data

for 6 months.

 

107

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To help them supporting

criminal investigations.

 

108

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With dataretention, a digital profile

is created from your online life.

 

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 Without knowing the contents of

your calls and emails.

 

110

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Did you know, that using this

data it can be predicted

 

111

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where you will be

going this week?

 

112

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And with whom you

are in contact?

 

113

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Whether you are seeing a psychiatrist.

Or call sex lines during the night.

 

114

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Dataretention keeps

a tight record.

 

115

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Even when you go 'offline',

and take the car you are being watched.

 

 

 

 

117

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On nearly all Dutch highways

you will find cameras.

 

118

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Increasingly, they are part of

the ANPR network.

 

119

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ANPR stands for Automatic

Number Plate Recognition.

 

120

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It links your license plate to

the location of the recording.

 

121

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This ANPR is crucial for strengthening

criminal investigation.

 

122

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due to increase in

crime strength.

 

123

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And it is extremely important

to keep this information.

 

124

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To store all the data.

 

125

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Why? Because if you are

suspecting an individual

of a certain crime having

been committed.

 

127

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you can use this system to see

whether a certain car

has been located on a crime scene.

 

130

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Which allows the evidence

to be strengthened.

 

131

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But the privacy is of

course guaranteed.

 

132

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Fighting crime. We all support that.

 

133

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But 99% of the passing cars

are regular people on their

way to work, or friends.

 

135

00:08:03,361 --> 00:08:06,501

So then why are all scanned

cars recorded in a database?

 

136

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That's not being answered

by the justice department.

 

137

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Data. More and more of it.

 

138

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In the last two years,

we created more data

then in all past

years combined.

 

140

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For a long time, it was very

complicated and expensive

to store information.

 

142

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You could collect data, but it was

too expensive to keep storing it.

 

143

00:08:27,654 --> 00:08:32,529

Now that hard-disks and other media

have become so cheap,

 

144

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you don't ever have

to delete anything again.

 

145

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It wasn't until a short time ago, you

had to periodically empty your mailbox

because it was full.

 

147

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That's a problem we

don't have anymore.

 

148

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This is because

data is cheap now.

 

149

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So just like you don't empty

your mailbox anymore,

 

150

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companies don't wipe their

old hard-disks anymore either.

 

151

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They keep stacking them.

 

152

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What scares me a little,

is that corporations are collecting huge

amounts of data about me.

 

154

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Corporations and governments

by the way.

 

155

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That at a certain moment the

analysis tools will get so powerful

that they can actually do

something with that data.

 

157

00:09:05,645 --> 00:09:08,950

And I know that this could

have consequences.

 

158

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At the moment I don't know yet

what those consequences might be.

 

159

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But it's a very scary idea to me,

that so much is being stored.

 

160

00:09:14,942 --> 00:09:17,746

And this can all be linked

together at a certain time.

 

161

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It sounds unbelievable,

 

162

00:09:19,563 --> 00:09:22,422

but over 60 years ago,

somebody already predicted

 

163

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more and more technology would

have a damaging effect.

 

164

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For example did we foresee that our

mails to friends and beloved would be read?

 

165

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No? Meet DPI.

 

166

00:09:49,891 --> 00:09:53,847

Deep Packet Inspection is an

analysis tool for electronic traffic.

 

167

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For targeted commercials

or copyright enforcement.

 

168

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In ordinary language: possibly

reading along with your emails.

 

169

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Most people say, if you ask:

 

170

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"What would you say if an email provider

would read the contents of your mails,

 

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and adjusts its advertising

based on those contents?"

 

172

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Then half of the people say

'I don't think that happens.'

 

173

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And a slightly smaller part says

'I don't think it will every happen'.

 

174

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'It's something for paranoid people to

think that companies would read my mails.'(Langer)

 

175

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Scanned in the tram.

 

Followed in the car.

 

Streets full with camera's.

 

A picture at the border.

 

My phone behavior mapped

with millimeter precision.

 

And my emails being read.

 

179

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Ok stop.

 

180

00:10:31,545 --> 00:10:34,397

Is it just me, or is this

getting a bit much?

 

181

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What was the definition for privacy again?

 

182

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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or

unlawful interference within his privacy, right?

 

183

00:10:41,157 --> 00:10:44,806

If there are cameras along the road,

those speed cameras,

 

184

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then people adjust

their behavior.

 

185

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If there are pictures being

taken or not.

 

186

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Its they idea of possibly

being monitored.

 

187

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The domed prison is based

on this principle.

 

188

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In the center a watchtower

with blinded windows.

 

189

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Prisoners know they could

be watched all the time.

 

190

00:11:02,649 --> 00:11:05,244

This might not be true all the time,

but they will behave.

 

191

00:11:05,284 --> 00:11:06,979

They will behave differently.

 

192

00:11:07,027 --> 00:11:09,378

And in a prison I can

understand this.

 

193

00:11:09,401 --> 00:11:12,096

But the panopticon as

this concept is called

begins to apply more and more

to our modern society.

 

195

00:11:31,287 --> 00:11:33,068

Medieval prisons.

 

196

00:11:33,126 --> 00:11:36,087

They were dark cellars, filled with

vermin and torture chambers.

 

197

00:11:36,447 --> 00:11:38,307

But the people in charge

had a problem.

 

198

00:11:38,963 --> 00:11:42,408

Increasingly, prisoners wanted to

escape these horrible conditions.

 

In the unwatched prison cells

they could work for months,

on secret tunnels

and escape plans.

 

201

00:11:49,019 --> 00:11:52,094

The solution to this underground

chaos unfortunately didn't arrive

until the 19th century.

 

It was designed by the English

architect Jeremy Bentham.

 

203

00:11:55,335 --> 00:11:57,772

He thought of a construction

for the perfect prison.

 

204

00:11:58,090 --> 00:12:00,863

His idea: take all the prisoners

above the surface.

 

205

00:12:01,989 --> 00:12:03,825

Put them in rows next to each other.

 

206

00:12:04,052 --> 00:12:05,201

Illuminate it properly.

 

207

00:12:05,286 --> 00:12:07,560

Get to know the prisoners,

their behavior.

 

208

00:12:08,681 --> 00:12:11,290

Give them the feeling of

always being watched.

 

209

00:12:12,159 --> 00:12:13,784

Only then can you control them.

 

210

00:12:20,511 --> 00:12:24,081

"A fingerprint in your passport,

I actually think that's a good idea."

 

211

00:12:24,178 --> 00:12:24,858

Really?

 

212

00:12:25,048 --> 00:12:27,657

Yes, and I think it

also helps to

solve crimes, catch

people sooner.

 

214

00:12:32,913 --> 00:12:35,742

So the government can get

a better image of its own society."

 

216

00:12:38,749 --> 00:12:40,523

I have nothing to hide.

 

217

00:12:41,149 --> 00:12:42,852

Let them watch, I just walk around.

 

218

00:12:43,194 --> 00:12:48,071

And if you live normally, then what

about it? Then it's not a problem at all.

 

219

00:12:50,126 --> 00:12:54,746

Then let them watch and see me.

I don't have anything to hide.

 

220

00:12:54,766 --> 00:12:56,907

As long as it's not causing any trouble.

- Yes.

 

221

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I think when it does cause trouble,

then people will start to think about it.

 

222

00:13:05,173 --> 00:13:07,314

It was a thursday night, in Hoofddorp, near Amsterdam.

 

223

00:13:07,933 --> 00:13:10,699

Two girls, aged 3 and 7,

were sleeping.

 

 

 

224

00:13:10,994 --> 00:13:12,986

Their parents in the

room next to them.

 

PoliCE: 381. over.

Maybe you can try to get him right now.

 

225

00:13:20,759 --> 00:13:24,340

35 armed police officers with

automatic rifles stormed the house.

 

226

00:13:24,473 --> 00:13:27,208

They arrest the father, a drugs-criminal.

 

227

00:13:28,125 --> 00:13:29,719

And that wasn't the first time.

 

228

00:13:29,853 --> 00:13:32,442

Forced into the side of the road,

arrested on the airport,

 

229

00:13:32,557 --> 00:13:34,535

and prosecuted for

drugs related crimes.

 

230

00:13:34,967 --> 00:13:36,553

There was just one problem.

 

231

00:13:36,640 --> 00:13:38,515

This was not the man they sought.

 

232

00:13:38,863 --> 00:13:41,620

But the father and good

citizen Ron Kowsoleea.

 

233

00:13:41,659 --> 00:13:43,504

He found himself in

his own nightmare.

 

234

00:13:44,171 --> 00:13:46,608

An old classmate stole

his identity.

235

 

00:13:47,504 --> 00:13:51,738

This is why Kowsoleea was registered

in the police databases as a big criminal.

 

236

00:13:52,742 --> 00:13:55,906

Still after many promises, the

government made this mistake many times.

 

237

00:13:56,569 --> 00:13:59,890

The computer kept saying that Ron

was the perpetrator of heavy crimes.

 

238

00:14:00,347 --> 00:14:01,574

He was powerless.

 

239

00:14:02,017 --> 00:14:03,939

Even the minister of justice said:

 

240

00:14:04,147 --> 00:14:07,366

"Sir, you ARE his criminal.

Protests are futile."

 

241

00:14:07,581 --> 00:14:10,105

Only several years later,

the error was corrected.

 

242

00:14:10,189 --> 00:14:12,634

The Kowsoleea family went

bankrupt due to this case.

 

243

00:14:12,820 --> 00:14:13,886

They live on the street.

 

244

00:14:14,141 --> 00:14:16,775

All those errors in these systems

and in the handling of them by humans.

 

246

00:14:20,745 --> 00:14:22,596

And I might sound paranoid, but

I know this from cases.

 

This can also follow

you around internationally.

 

249

00:14:31,349 --> 00:14:33,052

That is exactly the oddity.

 

250

00:14:33,136 --> 00:14:37,379

The spreading of all this

personal information,

is the upcoming new venture for

criminals, the identity fraud.

 

252

00:14:44,674 --> 00:14:47,260

So data, and storing it,

can be dangerous.

 

253

00:14:47,297 --> 00:14:49,500

Systems are prone to errors

and can be hacked.

 

254

00:14:49,703 --> 00:14:51,320

Like with Diginotar.

 

255

00:14:51,412 --> 00:14:56,389

There is a Dutch company that

offers security certificates.

 

256

00:14:56,501 --> 00:15:00,853

They secure government websites,

online banking applications,

and the tax department.

 

258

00:15:03,669 --> 00:15:07,114

The party who supplied these certificates,

appeared to have been hacked,

for quite a while.

 

260

00:15:10,696 --> 00:15:13,797

They knew it themselves,

but hadn't told the public.

 

261

00:15:13,830 --> 00:15:17,267

This bubble blew, which had

large international consequences.

 

262

00:15:17,399 --> 00:15:20,071

Suddenly Windows Update could

no longer be considered secure.

 

263

00:15:20,157 --> 00:15:25,423

The largest computer operating system

basically had a huge security hole.

 

264

00:15:25,510 --> 00:15:28,861

Because a Dutch company had

made such a serious mistake.

 

265

00:15:28,932 --> 00:15:30,737

This caused a lot of criticism.

 

266

00:15:30,826 --> 00:15:33,430

Recently I was on an international

conference for hackers.

 

267

00:15:33,446 --> 00:15:37,160

If you mention your Dutch nationality,

this leak was the first topic of discussion.

 

268

00:15:37,203 --> 00:15:39,523

Diginotar?

- Yes, Diginotar.

 

269

00:15:39,889 --> 00:15:44,466

Diginotar taught us that very personal

information can easily land on the streets.

 

270

00:15:45,123 --> 00:15:46,748

But faith in technology is big.

 

271

00:15:46,772 --> 00:15:50,561

It penetrates into the most private

environments of our society.

 

272

00:15:51,166 --> 00:15:54,033

I'm visiting Ronald van der Berg,

a psychiatrist.

 

273

00:15:54,080 --> 00:15:56,783

Out of protest, he closed his practice. Why?

 

274

00:15:57,269 --> 00:16:00,089

My office has been closed for two years

because of the DBC, the 'Diagnose

Behandel Combinaties'.

 

276

00:16:04,042 --> 00:16:05,964

When visiting a psychiatrist

in the Netherlands,

 

277

00:16:05,982 --> 00:16:09,115

 it is mandatory by law to send your

diagnosis to a national database.

 

278

00:16:09,742 --> 00:16:12,906

Anonymity at the psychiatrist

is now a thing of the past .

 

279

00:16:12,944 --> 00:16:15,264

Recorded are such things

as your condition,

 

280

00:16:15,295 --> 00:16:18,662

your place of residence,

your date of birth.

 

281

00:16:18,684 --> 00:16:21,738

the type of treatment you are

receiving, your medication.

 

282

00:16:21,899 --> 00:16:26,094

A psychiatrist quitting a flourishing

practice because of privacy violations.

 

283

00:16:26,415 --> 00:16:27,741

This shocks me.

 

284

00:16:27,796 --> 00:16:30,429

I decided to pay the creator

of this DBC a visit.

 

285

00:16:31,872 --> 00:16:34,591

The information your are submitting

about the patient is minimal.

 

286

00:16:34,626 --> 00:16:37,485

It is called

a minimal dataset.

 

287

00:16:37,955 --> 00:16:43,634

Because the requirement for storing

patient data is: keep it minimal.

 

288

00:16:43,713 --> 00:16:48,337

But is it minimal when it for example says

'Lightly suicidal and depressed'?

 

289

00:16:48,361 --> 00:16:50,072

Is that minimal?

- Yes, that is minimal.

 

290

00:16:50,109 --> 00:16:52,672

And what if you went into therapy,

- Yes

 

291

00:16:53,158 --> 00:16:57,486

Would you mind your diagnosis

being stored in such a database?

 

292

00:16:57,865 --> 00:17:01,209

No, I don't think so. Why?

 

293

00:17:01,411 --> 00:17:05,794

What if it says 'This man is depressed',

because it doesn't say more then that.

 

294

00:17:06,328 --> 00:17:10,273

That's common, that's a normal

thing in this society, right?

 

295

00:17:10,297 --> 00:17:12,030

It even happened in

the times of Plato.

 

296

00:17:12,109 --> 00:17:16,038

So what if it says,

this man has

sexual fantasies that aren't

accepted by society?

 

It will never say that.

 

298

00:17:18,834 --> 00:17:20,693

It won't? It will never say that?

 

299

00:17:20,979 --> 00:17:23,073

It can't be noted like that.

 

300

00:17:23,146 --> 00:17:26,044

However, it could mention,

say I was a pedophile,

 

301

00:17:26,442 --> 00:17:30,358

DBC Registration - Dr. J. Swinkels,

Diagnosis: Sexual Disorder Pedophilia.

 

302

00:17:30,397 --> 00:17:33,311

it will say that.

And then

you will have a problem.

 

303

00:17:33,371 --> 00:17:35,629

That would be a problem

- Yes, it would be.

 

304

00:17:35,671 --> 00:17:38,773

And that would be a problem for

both the patient, and me.

 

305

00:17:38,896 --> 00:17:42,076

If I would be a pedophile,

and I would act it out,

 

306

00:17:42,473 --> 00:17:46,671

there would be quite some interest

in a list of diagnosed pedophiles.

 

307

00:17:46,712 --> 00:17:51,601

The data in the DBS is stored at both the

government, and at your insurance company.

 

308

00:17:51,734 --> 00:17:53,742

But is my depression safe there?

 

309

00:17:53,974 --> 00:17:58,607

This information has double encryption,

which means it is encrypted twice.

 

310

00:17:58,659 --> 00:18:00,699

So it is more secure then

your ATM card.

 

311

00:18:00,903 --> 00:18:02,942

Bart Jacobs - Professor Computer Security

Double encryption does not tell me a lot,

 

312

00:18:02,972 --> 00:18:05,566

Bart Jacobs - Professor Computer Security

what matters is: who has the keys?

 

313

00:18:05,592 --> 00:18:08,709

If the keys are out there on the Internet

then you can encrypt it 10 times.

 

314

00:18:08,728 --> 00:18:12,861

But that won't really offer any

 security.

 

315

00:18:12,897 --> 00:18:16,779

Look, if you have a group

of journalists

who turn breaking these

systems into a sport.

 

317

00:18:20,322 --> 00:18:23,759

To check if any mistakes have been made,

or when pretending to have my identity.

 

318

00:18:23,822 --> 00:18:26,123

You mean the reporter

Brenno the Winter?

 

319

00:18:26,155 --> 00:18:28,929

So you say you are Dr Swinkels,

and have a pass to enter a building,

 

320

00:18:28,994 --> 00:18:33,845

You break into the archives,

steal the file, and tell what is in it.

 

321

00:18:33,991 --> 00:18:39,041

Then saying 'This system is bad'.

 

I say the person doing this, is bad.

 

322

00:18:39,110 --> 00:18:41,805

But you could also say

'Welcome to the Digital Age'

 

323

00:18:41,836 --> 00:18:44,266

When creating these

databases,

there will always be people

trying to enter them.

 

325

00:18:46,867 --> 00:18:49,304

Yes, I understand your view.

 

326

00:18:49,350 --> 00:18:53,265

But it would be much easier,

without getting into a database.

 

327

00:18:53,287 --> 00:18:55,107

To just steal the physical files.

 

328

00:18:55,142 --> 00:18:58,793

But then you would need to go here-

- No, it's as simple as that.

 

329

00:18:58,825 --> 00:19:01,262

How?

- Just by breaking open the door.

 

330

00:19:01,300 --> 00:19:03,342

and the locker.

- Yes, but that's not the same

 

331

00:19:03,405 --> 00:19:06,669

because now you have a central

database where 1 person could-

 

332

00:19:06,686 --> 00:19:09,038

For example look at what

happened at Diginotar.

 

333

00:19:09,066 --> 00:19:11,113

Yes

Citation

Main credits

Vlemmix, Peter (Director)
Vlemmix, Peter (Producer)
Vlemmix, Peter (Screenwriter)
Koppen, Hilde (Producer)

Other credits

Editor, Nils Rensen; camera, Daan Nieuwenhuijs, Aage Hollander; music/sound design, Pastelle Sound.


Distributor credits

Peter Vlemmix

Peter Vlemmix
Peter Vlemmix

Docuseek2 subjects

Privacy

Distributor subjects

No distributor subjects provided.

Keywords

privacy; "Panopticon"; Scorpion TV

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